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BREAKING THE TRANSSUBSTANTIVE PLEADING MOLD:
PUBLIC INTEREST ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
AFTER ASHCROFT V. IQBAL
SCOTT FOSTER*

The history of American freedom is, in no small measure,
the history of procedure.1
–Justice Felix Frankfurter
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2
upended decades of federal pleading standards jurisprudence. The consequences of this decision, which replaced the venerable “no set of facts”
language and emphasis on notice from Conley v. Gibson3 with a “plausibility” requirement,4 were uncertain—until recently. While many commentators differed over the reach of Twombly,5 the Court’s recent decision
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal appears to settle the pleading standard debate firmly
in favor of heightened pleading, defined by the plausibility standard.6
The implications of this decision raise potentially dire consequences
for plaintiffs who seek access to courts in order to vindicate public interest concerns. Environmental plaintiffs particularly should be wary of the
burdens plausibility places upon their claims. For some of these litigants,
plausibility pleading may destroy their attempts to protect the health and
safety of their community and environment.
A cursory glance at the citation record of these cases underscores
the substantial shift in pleadings jurisprudence.7 Spreading beyond courts
*
J.D. Candidate, William & Mary School of Law, degree expected 2011. I would like to
thank Professor Scott Dodson for his helpful comments and the staff of the Review for their
hard work. Finally, I would also like thank my wife—without her love and encouragement,
this note would not be possible.
1
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
4
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
5
See discussion infra Part I.B.
6
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
7
Only nine months after Iqbal was handed down, federal courts have cited the decision
6,268 times. Courts cited Twombly, as of Feb. 18, 2010, 24,471 times. This information
was obtained from a Westlaw search from each date of decision through Feb. 18, 2010,
performed on Mar. 3, 2010.
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and legal circles, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions awakened new interest in the pleading standard debate in the media,8 and even moved into
the halls of Congress.9 The reason for this vast amount of attention on a
procedural interpretation case is the scope of its application.
Federal pleading standards are transsubstantive10 and therefore
applicable to claims brought under all substantive areas of the law. This
note will focus on this connection between pleading standards and substantive law. Increasing the pleading burden on plaintiffs through plausibility imperils both the principles underlying the transsubstantive nature
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and environmental public interest
litigation. This friction between the Rules’ normative origins and the plausibility standard provides an opening to explore whether the reasoning for
applying transsubstantive pleading standards still maintains coherency
when examined in the context of public interest environmental litigation.
Because the current environmental regulatory schema of the United
States leans upon environmental public interest litigation (also known as
citizen suits) for enforcement,11 the danger to the environmental regulatory
structure becomes readily apparent. Already, the courts are beginning to
use plausibility pleading to evaluate—and dismiss—citizens’ attempts to
enforce environmental regulations or recover damages.12 With this standard barring more citizen suits from the federal courthouse, the goals of
environmental regulation are less likely to be achieved.13 A heightened
pleading standard also constricts the future function of public interest litigation in regulating greenhouse gas emissions and asphyxiates the innovation of alternative enforcement models.14 In view of these challenges,
the purpose of public interest environmental litigation is understandably
at odds with the current Twombly standard.
To gain a broader vision of the role public interest environmental
litigation plays, this note also examines pleading standards in other
8
See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Sick of Iqbal, Part II: House Dems Working to Override Scotus
Ruling, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 28, 2009, 5:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/28/
sick-of-iqbal-part-ii-house-dems-working-to-override-scotus-ruling/.
9
See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
10
FED. R. CIV. P. 8. See discussion infra Part I.C.
11
See discussion infra Part II.A.
12
See, e.g., Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing an environmental
class action against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that survived a motion
to dismiss at the district court—before Twombly—for failure to state a claim at the appellate level—after Twombly).
13
See discussion infra Part III.A.
14
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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jurisdictions outside the United States. In turn, this provides greater
insight into the relationship between the underlying motives of pleading
standards and the environmental enforcement schema. Comparative analysis can help to determine whether Iqbal’s extension of Twombly best fits
the purposes of transsubstantive rules and environmental public interest
litigation. Additionally, pleading standards abroad15 highlight the increasing importance of creating procedural rules that further the interests of
the public in enforcing environmental regulation through litigation.
In sum, much of the disturbance caused by Twombly and Iqbal
retraces the familiar arguments against a transsubstantive pleading standard. The heart of these arguments may be traced to the early goals of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “uniformity” and “flexibility,” which
were thought to be met by the notice pleading standard.16 More importantly, transsubstantive rules were originally justified as the best way to
achieve “substantive justice.”17 After the reappearance of “fact pleading”
in the plausibility standard, however, other priorities seem to displace
these goals.18
This note argues that the plausibility standard thwarts the purpose or substantial justice of public interest environmental litigation.19
This creates dissonance between the goals of transsubstantive rules and
the pleading standard. The justifications for transsubstantive rules evaporate because justice for the public interest in environmental litigation is
less obtainable.20 In answer to this pleading problem, this note puts
forward a solution that calls for the partition of the current Twombly
pleading standard. Instead of plausibility, public interest environmental
litigation will return to notice pleading. After viewing all of the arguments
in context, notice pleading is better suited to the unique purposes of public
interest environmental litigation.21 Although problems exist with the implementation of this break, this note will attempt to provide justification
for the necessity of choosing this more difficult path.
Part I of this note explores the development of transsubstantive
pleading standards in the federal court system. Part II examines the rise
of public interest environmental litigation and the escalating importance
15

See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
17
See Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15
TENN. L. REV. 551, 551, 564–67 (1939) [hereinafter Clark, Fundamental Changes].
18
See discussion infra Part I.C.
19
See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
20
See discussion infra Part V.A.
21
See discussion infra Part V.
16
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of litigating future environmental issues. Part III demonstrates the
friction between the goals of environmental litigation and the heightened
pleading standard articulated by Twombly. Part IV compares the United
States’ pleading standard with other nations’ pleading standards in order
to gain insight into the procedural structure that allows both heightened
pleading and environmental litigation. Finally, Part V argues that public
interest environmental litigation in the United States necessitates a return to notice pleading, thus demonstrating the need for multiple pleading standards dependent on the underlying purpose of the substantive
area of the law.
I.

CONTEXTUALIZING PLEADING STANDARDS AND THE
TRANSSUBSTANTIVE DEBATE

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the pleading standard for civil litigation in federal courts.22 Described by some as
a “jewel in the crown of the Federal Rules,”23 Rule 8 serves an important
purpose in the structure and principles underlying the Rules. Crucial to
an understanding of the controversies surrounding its latest developmental iteration, the history of the creation of Rule 8 informs the current
debates concerning its function and formulation. Only then can one begin
the more difficult task of weighing the underlying values of the federal
pleading standard against the underlying purposes of public interest
environmental litigation.
A.

Development of Federal Pleading Standards

No examination of American pleading standards can begin without
an understanding of the United States’ procedural heredity. Immigrants
to the rediscovered world’s colonies brought judicial procedures adapted
from the English village tribunals familiar to them.24 As these foundling
British settlements matured, professional judges and lawyers trained in
the mother country’s courts settled down to practice civil litigation.25 By
the end of the War of Independence, the newly minted United States contained a cadre of lawyers versed in a uniquely American, but still recognizably British, form of civil procedure.26 Then, the individual states and,
22

FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (titled “General Rules of Pleading”).
Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1998).
24
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (1993).
25
See id. at 3.
26
See id.
23
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what became by 1787 the federal government, were left to choose their
own procedural path.27
Like the early colonists before them, the recently independent
states and the lawyers crafting their legal systems continued to adopt
civil procedural forms familiar to them, specifically the division between
actions in common law and bills in equity.28 Common law developed out of
the body of English court decisions that created actions or writs to prosecute against defendants in the courts.29 Writs described specific wrongs
committed by the defendant against the plaintiff and provided the court’s
authority to adjudicate the dispute.30 The common law procedural system
placed emphasis on the distinction between questions of facts and law,
using the writs to identify both types of issues and place them properly
before a judge or jury.31
Chancery courts, by contrast, heard bills in equity.32 Bills submitted
to the court were simple narratives of the facts.33 Judges then received
the defendant’s side of the story.34 These courts concerned themselves
with seeking “justice” because the disputes before them usually had no
remedy at common law.35 Decisions were orders to act or refrain from
acting consistent with the just decision of the court.36
Pleading standards in each court related to the function of the
court in acting upon the dispute; writs separated issues of law and fact for
common law judges and juries to decide.37 This resulted in highly specified
pleading formulations.38 By contrast, bills of equity presented a plain statement of the facts to the court, so the judge could investigate any wrongful
conduct on the part of the defendant.39 American courts inherited these
distinctions and subsequently applied them in their own courts.40
The state courts procedural evolution became more influential to
the development of federal pleading standards due to the Conformity Act
27

See id. at 26–27.
Id. at 15.
29
Id. at 16–17.
30
HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra note 24, at 15–19.
31
See id. at 17.
32
Id. at 15.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 14, 16.
36
HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra note 24, at 15.
37
Id. at 16–17.
38
See id.
39
Id. at 17.
40
Id. at 3.
28
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of 1789.41 Federal pleading standards at common law were tied to the
state jurisdiction where the court was located.42 Reform to traditional
procedure was slow in coming to the states, but the subsequent creation
of the Field Code in 1848, and its adoption by over half the states, led to
a substantial break with past pleading practices.43
The Field Code, named after its principle draftsman David Dudley
Field, was devised in New York.44 Removing the highly technical and
antiquated forms of action from common law, the Field Code’s draftsman
required plaintiffs to plead “in ordinary and concise language without
repetition.”45 Assuming this language, however, to be an adoption of equity
procedural goals would be a mistake. For Field, “procedure had to intermesh with the rights, in order for the rights to be delivered.”46 Outcomes
were to be swift and predictable, based upon carefully articulated rights in
the substantive area of the law.47 Though some equity procedural mechanisms were merged into the Field Code,48 the chief end of the draftsman
was to provide certainty.49 In their view, equity courts, along with their
goals of justice, flexibility, and judicial discretion, were better left forgotten
as relics of legal antiquity.50
Vestiges of the Field Code continued to impact federal civil procedure until Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.51 Charles
Clark, then Dean of Yale Law School, was selected to be the Reporter of
the Supreme Court Advisory Committee that would draft the new Federal
41

Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (“[M]odes of process . . . in suits at common
law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme
courts of the same.”); see Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil
Procedure I: The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 391–92 (1935).
42
See Clark & Moore, supra note 41, at 391.
43
See HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra note 24, at 24.
44
Id.
45
Act of Apr. 12, 1848, Ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 521 (simplifying and abridging the
practice, pleadings, and proceedings of the court).
46
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 936 (1987).
47
See id.
48
Id. at 934 (“The Code liberalized a party’s ability to amend pleadings and to enter evidence at variance with a pleading. It expanded the number of potential parties, causes of
action, and defenses that could be joined in one suit. It provided discovery mechanisms and
permitted the court to grant the plaintiff any relief consistent with the case made by the
complaint, and embraced within the issue.”) (internal citations omitted).
49
See id.
50
Id. at 934.
51
See generally Subrin, supra note 46, at 943–74 (discussing the development of uniform
federal rules).
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Rules authorized by the Act.52 Clark’s experience of pleading under the
Field Code “was a sort of morality play in which the demon, procedural
technicality, keeps trying to thwart a regal substantive law administered
by regal judges.”53 His vision of procedural law encompassed “uniformity”
and “flexibility” as central attributes in a system that allows parties to get
to the heart of the legal dispute.54 It is in this environment that Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was fashioned.
A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”55 Rule 8 does not mention
“facts” or “cause of action” requirements, unlike Code pleadings.56 Under
the Field Code, “facts” were subject to debate and, if not properly supported
by evidence, a pleading could be dismissed as improper.57 Moreover, “cause
of action” imported certain legal effects, when Clark’s goal was to move
beyond stating forms of action.58 In the final version, pleadings’ function
were narrowed significantly so that the complaint served to provide notice
to the defendant.59 Other traditional pleading functions were transferred
to other rules.60
Though resistance continued among some courts and scholars,61
the Supreme Court provided a broad playing field for the pleading rule.
In Conley v. Gibson, the Court articulated the notice pleading standard,
which states that complaints are not dismissed for insufficient pleading
unless “no set of facts” can support entitlement to relief.62 Confirming this
52

Id. at 961.
Id. at 973.
54
Id. at 976–77.
55
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
56
See Subrin, supra note 46, at 976.
57
Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749,
1753 (1998) [hereinafter Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence].
58
See Subrin, supra note 46, at 976.
59
See id.
60
5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1202
(3d ed. 2004). Traditionally pleadings served four purposes: “(1) giving notice of the nature
of a claim or defense; (2) stating the facts each party believes to exist; (3) narrowing the
issues that must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for speedy disposition of sham
claims and insubstantial defenses.” Id. Pre-trial conferences, discovery, partial and full
summary judgment assume more efficiently the burden of these purposes. Id.
61
See 1952 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference Report, Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion
of the Need for Amendment to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D.
253 (1952); Archie O. Dawson, The Place of the Pleadings in a Proper Definition of the Issues
in the “Big Case,” in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON PROTRACTED CASES, reprinted in
23 F.R.D. 430, 433–35 (1958).
62
355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
53
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articulation of the pleading standard over the intervening decades since
Conley, the Court emphasized the transsubstantive nature of Rule 8 in
the face of many significant and substantively diverse challenges.63 Then
suddenly, the tide of Supreme Court jurisprudence turned swiftly against
notice pleading with the advent of a consumer class action case alleging
antitrust conspiracy against telecommunication providers.64
B.

The Devolution of Pleading in Twombly and Iqbal

Plaintiffs William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus, representing
a class of local telephone and high-speed internet customers, brought a
class action suit for restraint of trade against defendants Bell Atlantic,
Southwestern Bell Corporation, and other incumbent local providers.65 The
pleadings alleged that the defendants “engaged in . . . parallel conduct”
in order to prevent other companies from entering the market.66 After
dismissal for failure to state a claim and the court of appeals’ reversal,
the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, declaring Conley’s
language to be a “negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”67 The
Court found that pleadings must contain “facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”68
The Court’s pronouncement in Twombly provoked strong reactions;
one facet of the discussion construes plausibility pleading to apply only
to antitrust cases,69 or possibly only extendable to analogous substantive
areas of law.70 Other scholars found the decision to be an interment of
notice pleading, establishing plausibility as a new procedural bar for the
63

See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that the courts may not apply a heightened pleading standard
in illegal search cases alleging municipal liability); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506
(2002) (holding that an age discrimination pleading does not require specific facts to
establish a prima facie case for discrimination).
64
See discussion infra Part I.B.
65
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
66
Id. at 548–51.
67
Id. at 563.
68
Id. at 570.
69
See Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 117, 117 (2007) (“[I]t is a misreading of Twombly to extend
‘plausibility’ beyond that [antitrust law] context.”).
70
See Kendall Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly?: A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008)
(“Antitrust cases comprised only 3.7% (40 out of 1075) of all cases citing Twombly in this
study; the remainder is representative of every substantive area of law.”).
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heightened pleading of facts.71 The Court’s insistence in the opinion that
the decision was merely a better formulation of Rule 8 garnered support
from those who believe that pleadings were always more stringent than
Conley suggested.72 In light of these varying implications and interpretations, the Court soon made its views clear, answering and inciting more
challenging questions.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal provided a definitive answer to those who questioned Twombly’s scope.73 Plausibility is now the pleading standard and the
key to unlocking court access.74 In applying this standard, Iqbal requires
courts to weigh the factual allegations dependent upon their “judicial experience and common sense.”75 When viewing the pleadings, courts must
separate out the conclusory statements as insufficient allegations to meet
the plausibility standard.76
Examples of the far reach of plausibility pleading can be summoned
from many substantive areas of law, but most pertinent to this note’s analysis are instances where Twombly and Iqbal are now invoked to attempt
dismissal of public interest environmental litigation for failure to state a
claim.77 The resultant change of federal pleading standards underscores
the power of transsubstantive pleading, and yet it also potentially cracks

71

See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008) [hereinafter Spencer, Plausibility Pleading] (“Notice pleading is dead.”). See also Twombly, 550
U.S. at 577 (J. Stevens, dissenting) (“If Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is to be interred,
let it not be without a eulogy.”).
72
See Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1063–65 (2009).
Professor Smith argues that:
The Court has made plain that, in its opinion, the Federal Rules always
required that at a minimum plaintiffs must state a claim that is logically
coherent—i.e., the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint must be both necessary and sufficient to establish defendant’s liability[ ] [and] [t]his Article
maintains that this . . . requirement is largely the aim of the Court’s
plausibility standard, that the Court correctly held that this requirement
was mandated by the Federal Rules . . . .
Id. at 1064.
73
See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
441, 458–62 (2009) [hereinafter Dodson, Comparative Convergences].
74
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’ ”) (internal citations omitted).
75
Id. at 1950.
76
Id. at 1949–50.
77
See, e.g., Bishop v. Brewer Envtl. Indus., LLC, Nos. 06-00612 HG-LEK & 08-00558
HG-LEK, 2009 WL 1544581 (D. Haw. June 2, 2009) (applying the plausibility standard
to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act litigation).
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the foundation upon which the transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure repose.
C.

Transsubstantivity and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned to eradicate
arbitrary legal distinctions.78 By removing these barriers, courts may
advance claims to the evidence-gathering phase of litigation in order to
undertake a more substantive analysis of the plaintiff’s allegations. To
achieve this end, uniformity and flexibility of process were invoked by the
Rules’ draftsmen to maintain coherency across all substantive areas of law
subject to civil litigation.79
Rule 8, the pleading standard, is the “keystone” which upholds the
entire procedural structure.80 Forcing Twombly’s plausibility pleading
standard to fit into this structure weakens the load-bearing capacity of
transsubstantive justifications underpinning the entire operation of civil
actions. Thus, the effects of Iqbal upon the justifications for transsubstantive pleading, uniformity and flexibility, must be examined. It seems that
the uniformity element of Rule 8 is left untouched by plausibility pleading.81
Flexibility, however, is another matter.
Notice pleading under Conley cast a wide net giving Rule 8 great
flexibility.82 The standard was over-inclusive, relying upon other procedural rules to further define or weed out bad claims.83 Plausibility requires
“a complaint to plead facts [beyond those] that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability.”84 The slightest increase in the factual pleading
burden implies an inclusivity gap between notice-emphasized pleading

78

See Subrin, supra note 46, at 977.
See id. at 976–77.
80
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 66, at 456, § 68, at 467–68 (5th
ed. 1994).
81
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Twombly left this question unanswered which created counterarguments against the standard based upon violation of the uniformity principle. Iqbal
resolved this dispute. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
82
See Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence, supra note 57, at 1754. Professor Marcus identified
data that suggest that pleading motions lead to final termination in three percent to six
percent of cases. Id.
83
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (sanctions for frivolous filings), 12(b) (motion to dismiss), 12(c)
(motion for judgment on the pleadings), 12(e) (motion for more definite statement), 16 (pretrial conference), 26 (discovery), and 56 (motion for summary judgment). See also Wright
& Miller, supra note 60.
84
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
79
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and plausibility-emphasized pleading. Because Twombly’s plausibility
standard requires more than consistent factual allegations, it is underinclusive when compared to Conley’s lower requirement. It follows that the
net cast by Twombly is narrower, and removes support for transsubstantive pleading on flexibility grounds when compared to notice pleading.
Critics of the transsubstantive approach to pleading argue that
uniformity is a flawed value with which to justify transsubstantive rules.85
Uniform rules retard the development of substantive law86 and in practice
are not “uniform” because of the “bewildering array of local rules, standing
orders, and standard operation procedures, to say nothing of case law.”87
These arguments are rooted in the view that substance is bound tightly to
procedure, and separation harms both.88
Supporters counter these arguments by recounting the difficulties
and injustices of Code pleading before the Federal Rules were enacted.89
They also maintain that uniformity encourages procedural learning and
subsequent sharing across substantive areas.90 Moreover, the challenge of
constructing the alternative substance-specific procedural rules is daunting.91 Perhaps most important of all, arguments could be made that flexibility provides greater assurance that claims will reach beyond the pleading
stage to receive some substantive analysis, even though the complaint
itself will not be optimized to efficiently execute the underlying purposes
of the substantive law.
Iqbal, however, weakened fatally the flexibility justification for
transsubstantive pleading standards. Now that heightened pleading under
the guise of plausibility drives the application of Rule 8, uniformity stands
alone. At best, uniformity provides a thin veneer that disguises the swirling undercurrents and tensions differing substantive interests create.
Professor Cover best describes this dilemma:
85
See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules,
84 YALE L.J. 718, 732–33 (1975).
86
See id.
87
Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988). Professor Burbank also argues
that the transsubstantive approach actually hinders true uniform enforcement. Id.
88
Id. at 714.
89
See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2067, 2082–83 (1989).
90
See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 778 (1993).
91
See id.

896

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 35:885

Our norms for minimal process, expressed in the constitutional rubric of procedural due process, are generally
conceded to constitute a substance-sensitive calibrated continuum in which the nature of the process due is connected
to the nature of the substantive interest to be vindicated;
yet our primary set of norms for optimal procedure, the
procedure available in our courts of general jurisdiction,
is assumed to be largely invariant with substance.92
The question for procedural policy stakeholders then becomes: is
uniformity sufficient to outweigh other interests in applying unique pleading standards to substantive areas of the law? Public interest environmental litigation draws out these substantive interests, throwing their
strength against the procedural boundaries meant to hold them in check.
The resultant dilemma makes the perfect case study to analyze whether
the underlying purpose of the law and litigation is more important than
the remaining transsubstantive justifications.
II.

ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The importance of notice pleading cannot be ignored when conducting an examination of the interaction between pleading and substantive
law. “Modern products liability, toxic tort, and environmental litigation
would be simply inconceivable without the combination of liberal pleading,
liberal joinder, and liberal discovery.”93 The underlying purposes of public
interest environmental litigation challenge the current pleading trend on
transsubstantive grounds. By reviewing the history and current function
of environmental regulation and litigation, the hardships that a plausibility
standard of pleading engenders can no longer be justified when litigation
is brought in pursuit of the public’s environmental interest.
A.

Understanding Environmental Advocacy in the United States

It is difficult to imagine a time when the American wilderness
was left to fend for itself. However, in order to investigate the beginnings
of environmental law, one must look to the acts of individuals that long

92

See Cover, supra note 85, at 732.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2242 (1989).
93
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preceded federal government’s legislative actions.94 For example, forest
husbandry and other resource management demonstrated Americans’
efforts to regulate the natural environment.95 This led to preservation and
conservation movements driven by private individuals, which accounted
for many of the early environmental reforms.96 Yet, for most of the nation,
entrenched in the industrial development era, the perils facing America’s
natural treasures hid behind the smokescreen of life in the city.97 Change
in the environmental movement did not occur until Americans began to
see their natural world with new eyes.98
After the end of World War II, prosperity bred leisure, interest, and
opportunity to explore the world outside urban and suburban centers.99 As
public awareness manifested growing concerns about the disadvantaged
legal protections afforded to their natural playgrounds, more people began
to recognize the rebound effect poor environmental stewardship would
have upon their lives.100
The 1970s saw the advent of citizen activism and mass media
coverage pushing congressional leaders to give higher priority to environmental issues.101 In response, twenty-seven federal laws and hundreds
of administrative regulations moved through Congress and the executive
branch.102 Over time, the increasing complexity of environmental concerns
were forced to retreat in the face of potentially devastating economic
impacts upon communities.103
The United States’ current regulatory schema for the environment is generally considered “command and control.”104 The government
94

See KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, 1945–1970, at 10–11 (2009).
95
Id.
96
See THOMAS MORE HOBAN & RICHARD OLIVER BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE: THE ENVIRONMENT
AND THE COURTS 2 (2d. ed. 1996).
97
See id. at 3.
98
See id.
99
Id.
100
See id.
101
See BROOKS, supra note 94, at 15, 167–68; NANCY K. KUBASEK & GARY S. SILVERMAN,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 123 (3d ed. 2000).
102
KUBASEK & SILVERMAN, supra note 101, at 123.
103
See HOBAN & BROOKS, supra note 96, at 5 (noting examples where environmental
concerns threatened the automobile industry and a region’s major employer).
104
Avery E. Carson, Integrating Conservation Uses into Takings Law: Why Courts Should
View Conservation as a Possible Highest and Best Use, 86 N.C. L. REV. 274, 287 (2007); see
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1235 (1995); see David
M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command
and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 290–91 (1998).
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regulates pollution amounts through permits and requires standardization
when better equipment or technology is available to dilute the problem.105
This regulatory structure is riddled with problems. Agencies charged
with supervisory powers are prone to “capture” by the very industries they
regulate.106 Bureaucracy is also prone to “rent-seeking” or self-interested
behavior, generally when a person chooses to advance their own power
over acting fully in the public’s interest.107 The political leadership of
regulatory agencies can also result in questionable or inconsistent policy
implementation.108
Many scholars criticize the current regulatory structure.109 Yet,
while the search for a more effective model continues, public interest litigation propels well-founded and emergent environmental concerns into the
public domain for resolution. The public may side step regulatory agencies’
inherent flaws and participate directly in resolving their concerns; thus the
public becomes its own advocate.
B.

The Function of Public Interest Litigation in Environmental
Regulation and Enforcement

Of the many forms environmental public interest litigation assumes,
the citizen suit exemplifies the function this type of litigation performs
in tending the nation’s environment. Citizen suits are “a mechanism for
controlling unlawfully inadequate enforcement of the law.”110 The citizen
suit provision allows citizens with standing to initiate suits in court to
enforce certain environmental regulations.111
105

Orts, supra note 104, at 1235.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
448–49 (1987).
107
Id. at 450.
108
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (illustrating the undercurrent of
political tension where several states sued then-President George W. Bush’s Environmental
Protection Agency in order to enjoin its regulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases as pollutants, at a time when Bush’s political party generally stood against regulation
of greenhouse gases).
109
Orts, supra note 104, at 1236–41; see, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Friends of the Earth, Foes
of Federalism, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 181 (“Environmental regulation in particular rests on the premise that an infinitely complex, fragile, and precious environment
can be protected only through a centralized, ‘Soviet-style’ command-and-control scheme.”).
110
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992).
111
Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 46 (2001).
106

2011]

BREAKING THE TRANSSUBSTANTIVE PLEADING MOLD

899

Within the environmental regulatory structure, these suits serve
several purposes. Environmental regulation is premised upon market
failure, which occurs when businesses are not forced to assume the externalized costs of their illegal pollution.112 Citizen suits can help to guard
against these externalized costs by increasing business accountability.113
They also empower citizens to act as private attorneys general.114 Probably most important of all, citizen suit litigation helps to de-politicize the
regulation process.115
Congress authorized extensive citizen suit provisions in many
major environmental statutes, including most notably the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”),116 the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),117 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).118
Citizen plaintiff relief includes injunctions, penalties, and consent decrees.119 Recent studies show that a majority of citizen suits are filed by
small local environmental groups.120 Defendants are more often private
parties, but studies indicate that approximately one-third of filed citizen
suits list public defendants.121 Overall, data show the continuing use and
importance of citizen suits in implementing regulatory policy against varied
defendants by means of the statutory remedies at their disposal.122 This
lays the down the track on which substantive environmental law collides
with the new procedural standard.
112

Id. at 42.
Id. at 42–43.
114
Id. at 43.
115
Id. at 44.
116
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006).
117
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006).
118
42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2006). Other significant environmental laws that contain citizen
suit provisions are the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (“EPCRA”),
42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (2006); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); and the
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006). The widespread inclusion of these
provisions lends the appearance of congressional approval to their efficacy in neutralizing
the aforementioned problems with the regulatory schema. But see Michael S. Greve, The
Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 341 (1990) (arguing that
congressional support for citizen suits is merely “an outgrowth of interest group politics”).
119
JEFFERY G. MILLER, ENVTL. LAW INST., CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 73–94 (1987).
120
Kristi M. Smith, Who’s Suing Whom?: A Comparison of Government and Citizen Suit
Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995–
2000, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 392 (2004).
121
Id.
122
See id. at 395–96.
113

900

III.

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 35:885

FRICTION BETWEEN HEIGHTENED PLEADING AND PUBLIC
INTEREST ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION

Understanding the development and underlying purposes of pleading standards compared with the function of public interest environmental
litigation contextualizes the age-old problem of whether pleading standards should be derived from the substantive law underlying the claim. In
order to demonstrate that the interests of transsubstantive pleading no
longer outweigh the interests of environmental litigation, this note assesses
the impact of plausibility pleading on current litigation. First, it scrutinizes whether the Twombly heightened pleading standard frustrates current public interest litigation. Then it tries the standard against potential
future developments and concerns of environmental plaintiffs.
A.

Iqbal Pleading’s Impact on Current Public Interest
Environmental Litigation

Contemplating heightened pleading standards in environmental
litigation is not entirely novel. In the early 1990s some judges imposed
heightened pleading requirements on environmental plaintiffs, generally
limited to claims under CERCLA.123 The source for this shift away from
notice pleading was the influential opinion of Judge Keeton in Cash
Energy, Inc. v. Weiner.124 The instances where such a standard would
likely be applied were limited to those pleadings with elements similar
to fraud,125 which is the one substantive action given its own pleading standard, Rule 9(b).126 Not all jurists, however, agreed with Judge Keeton and
therefore continued to apply traditional notice pleading to those claims.127

123

Carl W. Tobias, Elevated Pleading in Environmental Litigation, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
357, 361 (1994).
124
768 F. Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991). Here, the plaintiff, a condominium project owner,
brought suit against a neighboring property owner for violations of CERCLA because the
neighboring property was contaminated. Id. at 893, 895.
125
Id. at 897–900. Judge Keeton found countervailing tendencies against notice pleading
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because of the different pleading standard for fraud
in Rule 9(b) coupled with Rule 8(f)’s promotion of substantial justice (which he considered
to be an authorization to use judicial discretion for pleading standards). Although he admitted the analogy to fraud was “strained, CERCLA involves many of the circumstances
that have led courts to invoke higher standards of specificity in other contexts.” Id. at 900.
126
The Rule states that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
127
See Tobias, supra note 123, at 365–67.
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The lesson to be learned by the previous pleading developments is that
even uniform standards may cause inconsistent legal outcomes. These
past diverging views and results indicate the path Twombly pleading will
have for future environmental litigants.
For example, in Goliad County v. Uranium Energy Corp.128 the
plaintiff, Goliad County, filed a citizen suit under the Safe Drinking
Water Act (“SDWA”)129 against the Uranium Energy Corp. (“UEC”) who
attempted to obtain an “injection” permit for wells located at the mining
site within Goliad County.130 The plaintiff alleged that UEC failed to properly seal boreholes into these wells, subsequently allowing storm water
to enter the wells and pass through into the Evangeline Aquifer, contaminating the county’s drinking water.131 The court, however, found the
pleadings, which stated “UEC’s ‘pattern of intentional disregard of these
plugging requirements is sufficient to lead to the inference of intent to
emplace fluids in the subsurface,’ ” lacked sufficient factual allegations
under Iqbal to state a claim.132
By contrast, the court in Environmental World Watch, Inc. v. Walt
Disney Co. found similar allegations satisfied the plausibility pleading for
CWA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) violations.133 The plaintiffs alleged that Disney added chemicals to the water
used in their studio’s air conditioning system.134 As the cooling water was
pumped from the ground and returned through well water disposal lines
and pipes, hexavalent chromium (“Cr VI”) discharged “into the land,
water, and air surrounding the Studio Lot.”135 Disney attacked the pleadings through a 12(b)(6) motion because the plaintiff failed to allege any
discharge of Cr VI at toxic levels, as required by statute.136 The court
128

Goliad Cnty. v. Uranium Energy Corp., No. V-08-18, 2009 WL 1586688 (S.D. Tex.
June 5, 2009).
129
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2006).
130
Goliad Cnty., 2009 WL 1586688 at *1, *4.
131
Id. at *1.
132
Id. at *10–*11 n.7. “Nowhere in Goliad County’s complaint can the Court identify any
factual allegation supporting the conclusion that UEC knew or intended that its erroneous
plugging actions would result in the subsurface runoff complained of here.” Id. at *11 n.7
(emphasis in original). It must also be noted the court had already ruled the action unripe,
but conducted this further analysis under the assumption plaintiff’s claims were appropriately ripe, and that plaintiff had proper standing. Id. at *7–8. The pleading standard
analysis did not depend upon the case’s disposition as to ripeness or standing.
133
No. CV 09-04045 DDP, 2009 WL 3365915 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009).
134
Id. at *1.
135
Id.
136
Id. at *2, *4–5.
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disagreed, finding under Iqbal that a reasonable inference supports allegations of toxic discharge.137
Though the substantive law underlying the claims differed in each
suit, the pleading standard analysis employed by each court was very
similar. Both judges placed great emphasis on factual allegations sufficient
to move the claims into the realm of plausibility. The decisions reached
provoke the question of why there were such divergent outcomes? Both
courts found allegations under the pleadings to be lacking some specific
fact: the intention of UEC to contaminate water and the toxicity of level
of Disney’s Cr VI discharge. Interestingly, the court in Goliad was unable
to infer the missing fact, but the court in Disney was.138 The Goliad case
represents an entire class of cases where potentially meritorious claims
cannot move into discovery on the basis of pleading a fact that has not,
but might, come to light.
The concerns exemplified by these cases are not, of course, limited
to public interest environmental litigation.139 A recent empirical study
shows, after Iqbal, the probability for a successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion
is “more than twice as likely” than under notice pleading.140 In another
example, the heightened pleading standards imposed by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)141 are now argued to
impose a greater threat of dismissing meritorious claims.142 It has been
argued that notice pleading rules decrease the number of meritorious
claims dismissed.143 Not surprisingly, within the context of public interest
environmental litigation, the increased burden of heightened pleading
137

Id. at *5.
This note does not mean to imply that one example of divergent application of a standard
is conclusive evidence that the standard is flawed. But, it does suggest that, on the margins,
Iqbal’s pleading burden has the potential to screen out meritorious claims, demonstrating
the under/over-inclusive paradox.
139
The United States Senate Judiciary Committee recently held a hearing to discuss
whether Iqbal and Twombly should be overturned by legislation. Has the Supreme Court
Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.), available at http://
judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4189.
140
Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?,
59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 602, 620–21 (2010).
141
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
142
See Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing
with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1087–88 (1999).
143
Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 161 (2011)
(demonstrating that empirical data show a likely increase in dismissal of meritorious claims
under plausibility pleading); Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 71, at 481.
138
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will impact the enforcement of environmental norms by reducing both the
threat and consummation of citizen suits. Nevertheless, the current regulatory state is not the only area of concern as the role of public interest
litigation in future causes of action develops.
B.

The Day After Tomorrow: The Future of Public Interest
Environmental Litigation

In discussing the ramifications of the pleading standard shift on the
future role of public interest litigation, many potential problems exist.
Without oracular powers of divination, unwritten laws and policies that
do not yet exist are difficult to analyze procedurally. The purpose of this
section is to include the far reaching effects of Iqbal pleading as applied
to future, if not looming, environmental challenges in the environmental
litigation pleading standard discussion.
1.

Public Interest Litigation and Global Climate Change

Hardly a scholarly environmental article exists that does not mention or account for the brooding presence that global climate change has
over the future of environmental issues.144 The reason for this pervasive
concern would seem obvious. Yet federal courts, when applying procedural
doctrine, are creeping towards greater engagement, or perhaps entanglement, with the myriad challenges climate change poses.145 Already, some
environmental law practitioners find that pleading climate change actions
may be very onerous under Iqbal.146
The difficulty for climate change plaintiffs, perhaps more than any
other, is how to construct pleadings that avoid the type of “conclusory” allegations barred by Iqbal.147 Threading this judicially constructed needle may
144

See, e.g., Margaret Rosso Grossman, Climate Change and the Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
SUPP. 223, 223–24, 231 (2010).
145
See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (class action lawsuit
by landowners along the Mississippi Gulf Coast against oil and energy companies for
emitting greenhouse gasses, allegedly exacerbating the destructive effect of Hurricane
Katrina); see also Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (suit by Eskimo village against energy companies for emitting greenhouse gases,
allegedly melting protective Arctic Sea ice around the village); Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power Co.,582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (suit by several states against fossil fuel-burning
electric plants for contributing to the public nuisance of global warming).
146
Seth Jaffe, GHG Nuisance Claims? Yes? No? Maybe?, L. & ENV’T (Oct. 19, 2009, 8:21 AM),
http://www.lawandenvironment.com/2009/10/articles/climate-change/ghg-nuisance-claims
-yes-no-maybe/.
147
See supra Part I.B.
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be more than current scientific evidence gathering methods can sustain,148
particularly when the factual pleading bar is determined by the individual
judge’s “experience.”149 No doubt even the best good faith efforts by judges
to make “plausible inferences” will potentially suffer the same over-and
under-inclusive fate as current public interest environmental claims.150
Additionally, the purpose of climate change litigation may grow
to encompass more functionality than just vindicating the environmental
rights of individual plaintiffs. Recent scholarship demonstrates a new
purpose for litigating climate change claims-enforcing emission controls
through “diagonal regulation.”151 Because of the nature of United States’
dual sovereignty federalism, horizontal and vertical regulatory relationships may be shaped diagonally.152 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency exemplifies the diagonal regulation interests outlined in
climate litigation.153 Local, state, and federal jurisdictions, each with different priorities and regulatory mechanisms, may benefit from the opportunity to settle regulation boundary disputes through court access. It is
possible that these diagonal regulatory interests might be extendable beyond emissions regulation to green building, manufacturing, energy, and
other areas, such as land use policy. Thus, climate change litigation’s role
in shaping and enforcing climate change policy becomes more prominent
than ever.154
2.

Developing New Regulatory Models

The effect of heightened pleading standards also implicates the feasibility to create alternative models of environmental regulation and enforcement. The first model is the potential establishment of environmental
148

Francis J. Menton, Issues of Proof in Climate Change Litigation, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 29,
2009), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202437294161
(arguing that even if pleadings are accepted, the scientific data and their underlying
validity are subject to attack on scientific consensus grounds). The difficulty for judges
will be in determining who or what constitutes a consensus to establish factual allegations
in pleadings.
149
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
150
See discussion supra Part II.A.
151
Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory
Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 590–91 (2009).
152
Id. at 617–21.
153
549 U.S. 497 (2007). See also Osofsky, supra note 151, at 616–28.
154
See John Schwartz, Courts Emerging as Battlefield for Fights Over Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/business/
energy-environment/27lawsuits.html.

2011]

BREAKING THE TRANSSUBSTANTIVE PLEADING MOLD

905

“rights.”155 Scholars have proposed the development of environmental
rights for United States citizens as a better foundation for environmental
protection and enforcement, than the ad hoc, problem by problem, regulatory schema of today.156 If such a system did develop, then more individual
rights would be subject to litigation. Already, an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of individual right-based actions are dismissed for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).157 If the foundational structure upon
which environmental rights are to be enforced or vindicated is subject to
such a high pleading burden, then Iqbal pleading has the propensity to
extinguish the feasibility of some alternative regulatory structures.
Market-based and other economic incentive programs are another
model of environmental regulation that may considerably change the landscape of environmental policy in the United States. These types of approaches already include cap-and-trade programs, “pollution taxes and
subsidies, deposit-refund systems, and regulatory waiver or variance programs.”158 Past trends in implementing these forms of regulation indicate
the growing potential for their implementation; for example, a 1997 survey
found a 150% increase to over 100 different incentive mechanisms from
the survey five years previously.159
Going forward with these solutions, however, increases opportunities for market failures to adversely impact those environments and
communities with lower economic power.160 Critical to mitigating the disparate effects will be providing information to affected communities of
potential harms.161 Citizen suits provide access to this information, but
only if they are not dismissed for failure to make sufficient factual allegations in their pleadings.162 Iqbal pleading does and will dismiss more
citizen suits, thus preventing the dissemination of information to plaintiffs; and further growth of market-based solutions to regulate the

155

See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, An Analysis of the Rights-Based Justification for Federal
Intervention in Environmental Regulation, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 190 (2003).
156
See id. at 188–90.
157
See Hatamyar, supra note 140, at 556.
158
STEPHEN M. JOHNSON, ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2 (2004).
159
See ROBERT C. ANDERSON & ANDREW Q. LOHOF, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY § 12-1 (1997),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0216a-4.pdf/$file/EE-0216a
-4.pdf.
160
JOHNSON, ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 158, at 362.
161
See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms
Exacerbate Environmental Injustice? 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 153–56 (1999).
162
See id. at 156.
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environment will be less viable in the face of intensified adverse impacts
on disparate communities.163
Though plausibility pleading is young for a Supreme Court precedent, its force is already being felt in many current environmental litigation issues,164 and its subsequent effects have the potential to drastically
alter the course of public interest environmental litigation in this country.
IV.

COMPARATIVE PROCEDURAL INSIGHT: INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES
OF PLEADING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION

Before reaching any conclusions in balancing the purposes of public
interest environmental litigation with the values of transsubstantive pleading standards, this note next examines how other countries regulate their
own environmental concerns through litigation. Despite apparent stark
contrasts, a comparative procedural study provides insight into the balancing acts other countries perform when contending with the normative
goals of both environmental and procedural law. The structural choices of
these countries highlight the imbalance of Iqbal pleading and further erode
the justifications for maintaining a transsubstantive pleading standard.
A.

Pleading Burdens and Civil Justice Structure

The United States pleading standard is, without a doubt, the most
liberal and exceptional in the world.165 At first glance, this would seem to
neutralize any beneficial insights gained from a comparative study with
other procedural systems. For example, a pleading for a simple negligence
case in Germany for an automobile accident would include:
1. specific allegations of precisely how and why the accident occurred,
2. an identified source of proof for each allegation,
3. the amounts of damage set forth with precision,
4. attached copies of bills, police and medical reports, and
even photographs to support the allegations.166
163

See Hatamyar, supra note 140, at 621; JOHNSON, ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 158, at 362.
164
See, e.g., Goliad Cnty. v. Uranium Energy Corp., No. V-08-18, 2009 WL 1586688 (S.D.
Tex. June 5, 2009).
165
Dodson, Comparative Convergences, supra note 73, at 443.
166
PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 198 (2004).
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The shocking level of detail and evidence submitted with a German
pleading seems diametrically opposed to the Federal Rules example: “On
date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the
plaintiff. . . . As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or
income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses
of $_______.”167 Iqbal, unfortunately, changes everything.168
Plausibility pleading moves the United States closer to the pleading requirements of other countries.169 This convergence opens new avenues for procedural exploration. In the context of environmental litigation,
however, the United States does not converge in other procedural or civil
justice structures that compensate for the higher pleading burdens imposed upon environmental plaintiffs. Therefore, any policy motivations
underlying Iqbal’s shift fail to address the unintended consequences of
higher pleading standards that other countries systemically compensate
for in multiple ways.
1.

Active Judges

The German Civil Justice system provides an excellent place to
start the examination of alternative procedures that mitigate the impact
of higher pleading burdens. Environmental actions may be brought in
either the Administrative Courts (Verwaltungsgerichte)170 or the courts of
general jurisdiction (ordentliche Gerichte).171 The pleading standards for
these courts are higher than even the Iqbal standard, requiring “particulars
of factual circumstances supporting the petitions . . . [and] the designation
of the evidence to be relied upon by the party to prove or rebut statements
of fact.”172 This high pleading burden would be devastating to environmental plaintiffs who lack sufficient preliminary evidence to bring a suit
in court. Yet, unlike American judges considering motions to dismiss under
the Iqbal standard, the active role of German judges allows for greater
167

FED. R. CIV. P. app. 11.
Note that Form 11 has not been revised after the Iqbal decision as of yet.
169
See Dodson, Comparative Convergences, supra note 73, at 443.
170
See MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 166, at 44.
171
See id. at 47.
172
OSCAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 170–72 (Oscar G.
Chase & Helen Hershkoff eds., 2007) (using translations from CHARLES E. STEWART,
GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE AND CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH (2001) and S.L.
GOREN, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
OF JANUARY 30, 1877 AND THE INTRODUCTORY ACT FOR THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULES OF JANUARY 30, 1877 (1990) to translate Zivilprozeßordnung [ZPO] §§ 130 no. 3, 5).
168
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substantive analysis before a claim is dismissed based on the pleadings.173
Thus, German environmental plaintiffs are likely to receive more information and further consideration of their claims.
In Germany, cases do not proceed in the compartmentalized
fashion of the Anglo-American legal tradition with its heavy emphasis on
pretrial and trial proceedings; instead, the German model consists of a
series of hearings, ordered and structured by the court.174 When a court
receives the plaintiff’s complaint, the judicial panel assigned to the case
determines the type of hearing and whether the case should proceed by
written briefs or preliminary hearing.175 The duty of the judges throughout these hearings is “ ‘to provide clarification’ (Aufklärungspflicht) in the
processing of the parties’ case.”176 In order to do this, the court may raise
additional issues, require the appearance of parties, documents, and other
objects.177 In sum, the active judicial role places the impetus for evidencegathering onto the court.178
When an environmental suit is potentially subject to dismissal,
the German court has already investigated the claim.179 A hypothetical
example would be an environmental plaintiff who has factual evidence
of toxic chemical residues in her backyard. She may bring an action and
expect the court to investigate the connection between her yard and the
neighboring manufacturer, who produces the toxic substance and whom
she names as a defendant. In contrast, a United States district judge evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion considers only the plaintiff’s complaint and any
exhibits attached thereto.180 The greater pleading burden in Germany is
counterbalanced with greater opportunity for the judge to view additional
evidence when reaching a decision; the U.S. judge’s scope of review is
limited to the pleadings.181
Further complicating the American judge’s determination is the
United States Supreme Court’s insistence on winnowing out the conclusory
allegations from the nonconclusory ones in order to make a “reasonable
173

See David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany:
Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1797, 1808 (1988).
174
See MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 166, at 165.
175
Id. at 209–10.
176
Id. at 165.
177
Id. at 166.
178
See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 824 (1985).
179
See MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 166, at 164–66.
180
FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c).
181
See id.; MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 166, at 164–66.

2011]

BREAKING THE TRANSSUBSTANTIVE PLEADING MOLD

909

inference” of a plausible claim based on “judicial experience and common
sense.”182 While “common sense” is not to be undervalued in judicial
decision-making, it is odd for a court to require more factual allegations
but rely upon “experience” rather than evidence.
A United States environmental plaintiff with insufficient information to plead certain factual allegations will not receive further opportunity for discovery or investigation by the court.183 As a result, the case
would likely be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Instead, active judges, like
those in the German system, may make more informed decisions about the
merits of the case. The structural relationship between pleading standards
and judicial roles is significant to the ability of environmental plaintiffs to
continue successful enforcement of environmental norms through litigation.
2.

Pre-action Discovery

Moving westward across the English channel to America’s legal
progenitor, one might expect to find a more familiar notice pleading standard. English courts, however, require “a concise statement of the facts
on which the claimant relies.”184 The rules place emphasis upon factual
pleadings.185 Now that Iqbal requires a similar focus, understanding how
English courts afford plaintiffs access to information is salient to a comparative analysis.
In 1996, Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls, published a significant
report on the civil justice system in England and Wales.186 Tackling the
problems of congestion and excessive cost, Woolf proposed sweeping reforms
by restructuring the entire civil litigation process.187 As a result, the English
Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) were established by Act of Parliament.188
182

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009).
See, e.g., Goliad Cnty. v. Uranium Energy Corp., No. V-08-18, 2009 WL 1586688 (S.D.
Tex. June 5, 2009). The district judge’s determination for dismissal was based upon his
inability to infer a certain fact based upon the pleadings. Id. This represents an example
of U.S. courts’ inability to further develop the evidence underlying the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s pleadings.
184
Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132 Rule 16.4(1)(a)9 (Eng.) [hereinafter CPR],
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/pdf/parts/part16.pdf.
185
See id. at Rule 16.4.
186
LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
civil/final/.
187
GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 340 (8th ed. 2006).
188
Civil Procedure Act, 1997, c. 12 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1997/12.
183
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Contained within the new rules, a simplified pleading form eliminated
excessive procedural hurdles in order to initiate claims.189 More importantly, the rules extended discovery (renamed “disclosure”) to parties prior
to filing the pleading.190 This new pre-action discovery procured a prominent role in ensuring parties to potential litigation made decisions founded
on “the information they need.”191
The underlying justification for pre-action discovery was to encourage well-informed settlement discussions.192 Before filing a pleading with
the court, an English plaintiff sends a letter to the defendant stating,
among other things, “the basis on which the claim is made (i.e. why the
claimant says the defendant is liable) . . . a clear summary of the facts on
which the claim is based . . . [and] what the claimant wants from the
defendant.”193 The letter goes on to contain “the essential documents
on which the claimant intends to rely . . . [and] identif[ies] and ask[s] for
copies of any relevant documents not in the claimant’s possession and
which the claimant wishes to see.”194 Parties who fail to respond to preaction discovery requests may be subject to sanction by the court.195
Pre-action discovery eliminates “information asymmetry” because
plaintiffs may request information necessary to meet their pleading burden.196 Environmental plaintiffs safeguarding the public interest could
potentially avoid costly and unbeneficial litigation. If information “disclosed” by opposing parties does substantiate the plaintiff’s claims, then the
heightened pleading burden of Iqbal is less likely to prove fatal to a claim
with merit. In either case, England’s civil procedure structure compensates
environmental plaintiffs for the burden placed upon their pleadings. The
United States does not.197
189

See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 187, at 358. See also CPR, supra note 184, at Rule
16.4.
190
WOOLF, supra note 186, at ch. 9–10.
191
Id. at ch. 10, para. 6.
192
Id. at ch. 10, paras. 1, 6.
193
CPR Practice Direction: Pre-Action Conduct Annex A § 2.1 (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/pdf/practice_directions/pd_pre-action
_conduct.pdf.
194
Id. § 2.2.
195
Id. § 2, paras. 4.5–4.6.
196
Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 88–89 (2010)
[hereinafter Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery].
197
England is not the only country to require “disclosure” prior to filing a pleading with
the court. Japan’s civil law system implemented pre-action discovery requests based in part
on informal exchanges that already occurred among Japanese lawyers. Luke Nottage,
Civil Procedure Reforms in Japan: The Latest Round, 22 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 81, 83–84
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Specialized Courts

Besides changing the role of judges and information-sharing among
parties, some countries devised separate court structures for those who
wish to bring environmental actions. Germany, for instance, has separate
administrative courts that encapsulate all levels of trial and review for
certain environmental claims.198 Starting from courts of first instance,
litigants may seek review in intermediate appellate courts culminating
in a final appeal to the Federal Supreme Administrative Court.199 French
litigants navigate claims through more than just a civil-criminal divide;
they also contend with courts of public and private law.200 Sweden, however, is the first country to establish an independent environmental court
system.201 In an effort to balance the interests of environmental plaintiffs
and defendants, Sweden has utilized specialized courts.202 An examination between the pleading burden placed upon environmental plaintiffs in
Sweden and the role of their specialized courts proves constructive to a
comparative analysis.
Sweden’s pleading standard, with its factual emphasis, is comparable to the other heightened pleading burdens discussed previously.203
The difference lies in the judicial panel reviewing the submitted pleadings.
Environmental courts in Sweden are made up of “one professional judge,
one environmental technician, and two experts,”204 one with experience in
the disputed area in the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and
one with industrial or local government experience.205 The purpose of this

(2005). Professor Nottage believes these reforms are part of a larger procedural convergence
toward earlier disclosure of factual information. Id. at 86.
198
See MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 166, at 44.
199
Id.
200
See CHASE ET AL., supra note 172, at 116–22.
201
Jan Darpö, Environmental Justice Through Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned
from the Swedish Experience, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 176, 177
(Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009).
202
See id. at 176–77.
203
See supra Part III. Swedish pleadings must contain, “1. a distinct claim, 2. a detailed
account of the circumstances invoked as the basis of the claim, 3. a specification of the
means of evidence offered and what shall be proved by each means . . . .” Rättegångsbalken
[RB] [Code of Judicial Procedure] 42:2 (Swed.), available at http://www.regeringen.se/
content/1/c4/15/40/472970fc.pdf (English translation published by the Swedish Ministry
of Justice). The requirement for specifying evidence relied upon in the claim is similar
to the German requirement. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
204
Darpö, supra note 201, at 179.
205
Miljöbalk [MB] [Environmental Code] 20:4 (Swed.), available at http://www.regeringen
.se/content/1/c6/02/28/47/385ef12a.pdf (English translation published by the Swedish
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arrangement allows the court to reach determinations with credible knowledge of the dispute.206 This structure elicits one very important implication
for plaintiffs, namely that the judicial panel reviewing the pleadings has
a greater depth of knowledge to draw upon.207 The resultant decisions of
these courts inspire greater confidence in their ability and accuracy to
evaluate the pleadings.
By contrast, Iqbal placed the generalist federal judges considering
environmental claims in a quandary.208 In order to advance pleadings to
discovery, judges must assess the nature of the allegations by ascertaining whether “reasonable inferences”209 based upon their “experience” may
be drawn from them.210 Unlike their Swedish counterparts, there are no
“experts” or “advisors” with actual “judicial experience” in the disputed
matter.211 Nor is the public interest environmental litigation docket large
enough to likely foster similar experience with the United States federal
bench.212 Unsurprisingly, the probable result is inconsistent at best or
wildly divergent at worst. Inferences regarding pleading allegations will
lead to exclusion of meritorious plaintiffs and inclusion of unmeritorious
ones.213 The Swedish model, with its emphasis on specialized knowledge
Ministry of Justice). The professional judge determines the make-up of the expert position,
choosing either the industrial or government expert. Id. The experts are nominated by their
respective field’s authorities. Darpö, supra note 201, at 179. The panel may be extended
to include an additional professional judge and environmental advisor. MB 20:4 supra.
206
Darpö, supra note 201, at 179.
207
Id.
208
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009).
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Although it is true that the federal judges may determine from the pleadings, attached
exhibits, and in some cases oral argument from the parties whether or not the pleading
burden has been satisfied, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), there will be (assuming the judge has little
or no prior experience with the issue) no substantial judicial experience related to the
environmental issue, merely the potential for “expert” advocacy.
212
See Smith, supra note 120, at 385. From 1995 to 2000 there were only 287 environmental citizen suits initiated under the major environmental regulatory acts; furthermore,
the federal government only prosecuted 610 cases over the same period. Id.
213
A recent study comparing administrative law judges (“ALJs”) with generalist state and
federal judges indicates that the “intuitive” knowledge that generalist judges rely upon
often leads to “erroneous decisions.” Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.
Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice,
58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1479 (2009). At the pleading stage it is feasible to assume these erroneous decisions would include both over-and under-inclusive dismissals for failure to state
a claim. But see Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1667 (2009) (arguing that the empirical literature supporting specialized courts needs
more development and that in its limited state, the data cannot support a broad embrace
of specialized courts as “proven” to be more efficient and accurate than generalist ones).
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through specialized courts, lessens the burden fact pleading places upon
its citizens.
B.

The Convergent Rise of Access to Environmental Justice

Plausibility pleading in Iqbal regulates plaintiff access to the federal
courts. Its transsubstantive application to environmental claims begins
to diverge from the growing international trend of broadening access to environmental justice. By examining the measures undertaken and normative
choices other countries make to increase this access, further evaluative
steps are taken in balancing the interests of uniform pleading standards
against the purpose and function of environmental litigation.
214

1.

The Aarhus Convention

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (“UNECE”)
Aarhus Convention215 is the first international treaty to focus on the rights
and obligations of governments to provide their citizens an oversight role
in protecting the environment.216 Upholding this objective are the three
pillars of the Convention, “access to information, public participation,
and access to justice.”217 At its core, the Aarhus Convention is the legatee of several human-rights-based environmental agreements.218 Thus,
214

Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 873, 876 (2009).
215
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 [hereinafter
Aarhus Convention].
216
Svitlana Kravchenko, The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance with
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2007).
217
Jeremy Wates, The Aarhus Convention: A Driving Force for Environmental Democracy,
2 J. FOR EUR. ENVTL. & PLAN. L. 2, 2 (2005). See also Aarhus Convention, supra note 215,
at art. I.
218
Christian Schall, Public Interest Litigation Concerning Environmental Matters Before
Human Rights Courts: A Promising Future Concept?, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 417, 432–33 (2008).
The text of the Aarhus Convention itself notes that the parties are:
[r]ecalling principle l of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, [r]ecalling also principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, [r]ecalling further General Assembly
resolutions 37/7 of 28 October 1982 on the World Charter for Nature and
45/94 of 14 December 1990 on the need to ensure a healthy environment
for the well-being of individuals, [and] [r]ecalling the European Charter
on Environment and Health adopted at the First European Conference on
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Aarhus is the culmination of the “rights-based approach” to environmental enforcement.219
While the pillar dichotomy implies equal importance, “access to
justice” requires preeminence in order to buttress the other pillars of
Aarhus and “empower[ ] [the] citizens and NGOs [Non-Governmental
Organizations] to assist in the enforcement of the law.”220 Currently
there are forty-four parties and forty signatories to the Convention.221
Upon joining:
[e]ach Party shall take the necessary legislative, regulatory and other measures, including measures to achieve
compatibility between the provisions implementing the
information, public participation and access-to-justice provisions in this Convention, as well as proper enforcement
measures, to establish and maintain a clear, transparent
and consistent framework to implement the provisions of
this Convention.222
The implementation of Aarhus is not without its difficulties.
Germany, for instance, struggled to reconcile the access to justice provisions with its “protective norm doctrine (Schutznormtheorie),” which
leaves little room for private enforcement of environmental regulation.223
Potential resolutions, however, exist for procedural friction between the

Environment and Health of the World Health Organization in Frankfurtam-Main, Germany, on 8 December 1989.
Aarhus Convention, supra note 215, at prmbl.
219
Wates, supra note 217, at 2. See also Benjamin W. Cramer, The Human Right to Information, the Environment and Information About the Environment: From the Universal
Declaration to the Aarhus Convention, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 73, 93 (2009).
220
Schall, supra note 218, at 433.
221
Chapter XXVII Environment 13, United Nations Treaty Collection, available at http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-13&chapter=
27&lang=en (the nations are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
European Community, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland).
222
Aarhus Convention, supra note 215, at art. III.
223
Schall, supra note 218, at 436.
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requirements of Aarhus and a nation’s current legal system.224 Whatever
the mode of implementation, the Aarhus Convention exemplifies the expanding prominence of public interest environmental litigation in regulating and enforcing environmental norms by establishing new avenues
for environmental justice.225
2.

Rights-Based Development in Public Interest Litigation

Public interest litigation on behalf of the environment continues its
march toward countries with economies in transition based on environmental rights. India, for example, has a constitutional right to life, which
has been interpreted to include the right to a “wholesome environment.”226
Pushed by public interest litigation, the Indian Supreme Court has developed the “public trust doctrine,”227 which it invokes when determining
issues involving the air, sea, water, or forests.228 The extension of this doctrine to these environmental resources further opened the Indian courts
to safeguard communities from government and private actors who now
receive judicial accountability.229 Although many variations of environmental litigation exist throughout the world, one particular theme is common:
countries are continuing to make procedural investments to provide access
to environmental justice. The United States would do well to recognize
this trend.

224

Id. at 436–38. The author suggests that Germany may be able to expand its standing considerations, which are problematic to plaintiffs (and thus access) under Schutznormtheorie,
by redefining the subjective rights (which affect standing) under their current environmental laws. Id.
225
Wates, supra note 217, at 6. “The third pillar . . . aims to provide access to justice in
three contexts: [ ] review procedures with respect to information requests; [ ] review procedures with respect to specific (project-type) decisions which are subject to public participation requirements; [ ] challenges to breaches of environmental law in general.” Id.
Aarhus also contains procedural requirements for these contexts, namely that they be
“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.” Id. at 7.
226
Jona Razzaque, Participatory Rights in Natural Resource Management: The Role of
Communities in South Asia, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 117, 120
(Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009).
227
Id. at 122 (“This common law concept . . . allows the public to question ineffective
management of natural resources . . . [because] certain natural resources . . . have such
great importance to people as a whole that it would be unjustified to make them a subject
of private ownership.”).
228
Id.
229
See id.
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RESUSCITATING NOTICE PLEADING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PLAINTIFFS

In completing a puzzle, first one lays out all the pieces on the table.
Next, the edge and corner pieces are separated out and connected together
forming a frame of reference, delineating the boundaries of the scene.
Finally, the difficult work begins as each puzzle piece is carefully selected
and placed in the location that fits the prescribed shape and matches the
corresponding surroundings. Understanding the relationship between
the transsubstantive federal pleading standard and its impact on public
interest litigation follows the same course.
First, this note laid out the context and development of transsubstantive pleading standards and rules “on the table.” Next, it identified
points of friction between the Iqbal standard of pleading and the purposes
of public interest litigation. It connected these points of interest by presenting the present and future boundaries of environmental public interest
litigation and supplied alternate visions of those boundaries through international comparative examples and trends. Now, the difficult task begins,
weighing the purposes of retaining a heightened transsubstantive pleading
standard against the purposes of environmental public interest litigation
in order to see which policy fits the most pieces into the final scene.
A.

Should Pleading Dissonance Be Resolved?

1.

Promoting Substantive Justice

The driving motivation behind the creation of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure was “[t]he idea . . . that procedural rules are but means
to an end, means to the enforcement of substantive justice, and therefore
there should be no finality in procedural rules themselves except as they
attain that objective.”230 Of course, Dean Clark and his fellow drafters were
not unaware of the intricate and difficult relationship between substance
and procedure, reflected in the oscillating war between the virtues of code
and equity pleading.231 Extrication from this dilemma lay in the new rules’
flexibility and uniformity, transsubstantively applied to all claimants.232
230

Clark, Fundamental Changes, supra note 17, at 551.
Subrin, supra note 46, at 961–73. See also Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice,
23 WASH. U. L. Q. 297, 297 (1938) (noting the continuing conflict between “substance and
form”). Clark states his view of procedural form by quoting an English jurist, stating “that
the relation of rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of a handmaid
rather than mistress.” Id.
232
Subrin, supra note 46, at 961–73.
231
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Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly, it appeared that
Conley’s interpretation of Rule 8 remained consistent with the drafters’
underlying principles.233 However, when plausibility replaced notice, the
harmony between promoting substantive justice and procedure became
dissonant.234 If the normative choices underlying a substantive area of the
law received less justice under plausibility, then it follows that Twombly
and Iqbal as applied to certain claims violate the “liberal ethos”235 of
the rule’s original intentions. Therefore, the threshold determination in
evaluating plausibility will be to ascertain whether substantive justice
is thwarted in a given area of the law.
Environmental public interest litigation is a function of the United
States’ environmental regulatory policy.236 It is the sword against those
who benefit from government oversight failures and the shield for parties
in danger of suffering environmental harm.237 With the advent of plausibility pleading, environmental litigation now bears a greater factual burden with a greater likelihood of meritorious claims being dismissed.238 The
substantive justice provided by this form of litigation is weakened and subsequently less effective.239 Plausibility pleading fails to promote environmental justice in violation of the spirit of the Federal Rules.
2.

Measuring the Value of Uniformity

Violation of the spirit of the Federal Rules alone may not justify a
dramatic departure from transsubstantivity, as to differentiate between
environmental public interest litigation and other claims. After all, uniformity and flexibility were provided as further concrete justifications240
rather than vague overarching principles like the promotion of substantive
justice. Flexibility, however, no longer remains as a dominant justification
for transsubstantivity because fact pleading constitutes a higher (and more
233

See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1,
19–21 (2009) [hereinafter Spencer, Understanding Pleading].
234
Id. at 26.
235
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433, 439 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus, The Revival].
“Rule 8(a)(2) was drafted carefully to avoid use of the charged phrases ‘fact,’ ‘conclusion,’
and ‘cause of action.’ ” Id. at 439. This policy language flies in the face of Iqbal’s insistence
that judges identify “conclusory” allegations. See supra Part I.B.
236
See supra Part II.B.
237
See supra Part II.B.
238
See supra Part III.
239
See supra Part III.B.2.
240
See supra Part I.C.
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rigid) bar for plaintiffs to meet.241 Uniformity, it seems, will be required to
do the heavy lifting on the justification front. Accordingly, the next analytical step must be to weigh uniformity over and against the underlying
purposes of environmental litigation, both present and future.
Adversarial legalism, a shorthand form for the nature of American
justice and its legal system, captures the important role litigation can play
in furthering substantive justice.242 The United States body politic suffers
from hyper-contradictory political goals, a mistrust of centralized governmental power, yet has an insatiable thirst for governmental protection from
harm (for example, environmental danger).243 In order to prevent these
diametrical forces from creating a political impasse, litigation (particularly
public interest litigation) supplies the safety valve.244 Reducing this release
function just to maintain uniformity increases political antagonism, an
undesirable consequence.245
The consequence of the unique part that litigation plays is the
world’s most responsive judiciary,246 which allows the ultimate source of
authority for any action to be the people that have a stake in the issue.247
When viewed in this context, it is necessary for environmental litigation
to be especially sensitive to the need for ultimate democratic control, because the protected resources, like water and air, are commonly owned by
the public.248 A rise in the pleading standard diminishes court access to
241

See supra Part III.A.
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 1 (2001).
243
Id. at 15.
244
See id. at 15–16.
245
Professor Kagan would disagree with this implication. It is his argument that adversarial legalism increases antagonism between the regulated and the regulators. See id.
at 202–06.
246
Id. at 16. This note does not tackle the issue of whether this is the “best” or most reliable
judicial system. Kagan himself makes many arguments critical of the current system and
the economic and social costs it imposes upon U.S. society. See id. at 207–28. Instead, this
note puts forward suggestions on how to work within the current system.
247
See ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL
85 (1982). To exercise final control over the agenda, “[a] large scale democratic system
might . . . [allow] the agenda of each demos . . . [to] complement others in such a way that,
taking into account the agendas of every demos to which each citizen belonged, every
citizen is able to partake in final control over the combined agendas.” Id. Professor Dahl
thought the above solution was the preferred method for federalist systems. Id. In general, Dahl sought to resolve issues of final or ultimate control, such as the very same “who
shall have the last word” problem Professor Kagan highlights as extremely costly and
inefficient in the public interest environmental litigation context. See KAGAN, supra note
242, at 207–28.
248
See Razzaque, supra note 226, at 122.
242
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public interest plaintiffs. Consequently, democratic control of these resources is lessened. Thus, uniformity, though virtuous in isolation, does
not appear so appealing when weighed against democratic control.
The nature of environmental litigation is also significant to this
debate. Environmental public interest litigation is not a static force, but a
dynamic one.249 Shifting environmental regulatory norms, such as climate
change litigation, also weigh in favor of greater court access to plaintiffs.250
Future regulatory models that make use of “private attorneys general”251
or rely upon economic or fundamental rights-based enforcement suffer
from the narrowing gateway to pleading environmental claims.252 If newer
or more efficient enforcement methods are to take hold, uniformity of
procedure should not stand in their way.
Another counterweight to the transsubstantive pleading standard
is the convergent rise of public interest litigation internationally. Other
countries with higher pleading standards scale their burdens according
to other compensatory mechanisms, whether judicial role, pre-action discovery, or specialized courts.253 Iqbal pleading made one change in the civil
justice structure without any systemic adjustments to compensate for the
impact upon environmental public interest litigation. Increasingly, other
nations are making procedural and structural changes to amplify the presence of environmental public interest litigation in their regulatory structures.254 Prospective plaintiffs, lawyers, and scholars alike should wonder
why uniformity would be upheld as a value to justify divergent procedural
choices. At the final weigh-in, uniformity fails to substantiate transsubstantive pleading standards when compared with the current function and
future role of environmental public interest litigation.
3.

Possible Objections

When sounding the alarm about the dangers plausibility pleading
imposes upon public interest environmental litigation, some scholars’ response will simply be: “where’s the fire?” More than one academic has identified multiple substantive areas where lower courts, long before Twombly
and Iqbal, applied varying degrees of a heightened pleading standard to
249

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
251
See supra Part II.B.
252
See supra Part III.B.
253
See supra Part IV.A.
254
See supra Part IV.B.
250
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different substantive areas of the law.255 This contrary behavior on the
part of some lower courts cannot be denied.256 However, of the laws surveyed in these studies, private actions appear to receive the brunt of the
heightened burdens imposed.257 Until the advent of Iqbal, public interest
litigation did not appear to suffer the same fate.258 Failure to address the
distinction between public interest and private actions reduces the effectiveness of objections based on these arguments.
On pragmatic grounds, other potential objections are those voiced
by the Court in Twombly, particularly that modern litigation requires
some form of filter to prevent discovery abuses and “groundless suits.”259
Although these concerns are certainly serious,260 environmental plaintiffs
operating through citizen suit provisions already face other court access
challenges. The effect of these established restraints diminishes the necessity of imposing higher pleading burdens.
The first hurdle citizen plaintiffs must pass is sufficient notice to
the regulatory agency.261 Plaintiffs who fail to provide this notice will not
255

See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988
(2003) (finding many areas of the law where courts have required general or targeted
heightened pleading). Included in his survey are antitrust, CERCLA, civil rights, conspiracy, copyright, defamation, negligence, and RICO claims. Id. at 987, 1011–51. See
also Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence, supra note 57, at 1778 (arguing that judges conceal
their heightened pleading standards through “common-law activity” in different areas
of the law).
256
See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. Although, it is also clear that the
Supreme Court has emphatically supported notice pleading in its cases up until Twombly
and Iqbal were handed down. See Spencer, Understanding Pleading, supra note 233, at 4–5.
257
See Fairman, supra note 255, at 1011–59. Even the CERCLA claims assessed by Fairman
only correspond to portions of the statute that pertain to private causes of action. Id. at
1021–22.
258
See id. at 1011–59.
259
See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217,
1232–34 (2008) (“[T]he Twombly majority repeated [its] concern over ‘groundless’ suits by
plaintiffs several other times, up to and including its closing explanation for why a more
rigorous pleading standard is the necessary policy cure.”) (citation omitted).
260
But cf. Fairman, supra note 255, at 1059–61 (contending that frivolous suits are more
perception than reality); Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
519, 520 (1997) (“We know remarkably little about frivolous litigation [because] [r]eliable
empirical data is extremely limited, and casual anecdotal evidence [is] highly unreliable.”);
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 71, at 452 (decrying the Twombly opinion’s
failure to distinguish between discovery costs and discovery abuse). “Further, and more
importantly, discovery abuse in the form of impositional requests is not an evil unique
to groundless or insufficiently pleaded claims.” Id.
261
Robin Kundis Craig, Notice Letters and Notice Pleading: The Federal Rules of Civil
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be able to bring their claims in court.262 The other major hurdle for these
claimants is standing, which narrows the plaintiff pool to those who suffer
“injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.”263 Each mechanism filters
claims that the government might otherwise redress, by way of notice provisions, or by filtering claims that are not brought by the “best” plaintiff
(which might imply that acceptable standing confers greater possibility
of non-meritorious claims in court). Most important of all, Congress and,
by delegation, the EPA, may further customize regulations or statutory
controls that screen public interest environmental litigation with the least
detrimental effects, something a blanket heightened pleading burden
certainly cannot do.264
There may be further possible objections that offer more potential
justifications for maintaining transsubstantive pleading standards for environmental litigants. Yet, the weight of analysis in favor of public interest
litigation commands an investigation into solutions that can ultimately
resolve the current dissonance between pleading and the purpose of environmental litigation.
B.

Moving Forward with Potential Solutions

At first impression, one might be led to advocate only one solution
to this procedural gridlock, namely a return to Conley’s notice pleading
standard for all plaintiffs. To effect that solution, however, would require
the cooperation of either Congress or the Supreme Court. Neither body is
likely to make such a wholesale revision.265 Consequently, other options
must be examined.
1.

Systemic Adjustments

So far the recurring theme of this note has been to present the
normative case for reverting public interest environmental claims back
Procedure and the Sufficiency of Environmental Citizen Suit Notice, 78 OR. L. REV. 105,
108–09 (1999).
262
Id. at 125. The Supreme Court held in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20
(1989), “that strict compliance with the sixty-day timing requirement was mandatory.”
Id. at 126.
263
Francisco Benzoni, Environmental Standing: Who Determines the Value of Other Life?,
18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 347, 347 (2008). “The scope of citizens’ suit provisions in
environmental regulations have been significantly curtailed by the standing doctrine.”
Id. at 348.
264
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 120.
265
See Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, supra note 196, at 54–55.
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to the notice pleading standard. But, this study would be remiss if it did
not include other potential solutions that were more systemic in scope.
Taking the comparative insights previously gathered from other nations’
civil justice structures, one might glimpse potential solutions to the current
pleading dilemma.
The first possible solution may be found in the role of the judge.
Like the active judges discussed previously,266 a highly involved judge may
be able to help clarify issues that may result in the resolution of the dispute (or at least mitigate the pleading burden on the plaintiff). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 contains management provisions allowing the
court to regulate pre-trial proceedings.267 Couple this power with a judge’s
discretion to allow limited discovery to proceed while a motion to dismiss
is pending under Rule 26(c),268 and suddenly a judge has the ability to
mitigate one of the detrimental impacts of heightened pleading.269 Now,
plaintiffs may gain access to discoverable information and subsequently
amend their pleading to meet the plausibility bar.270
While this solution receives high marks for ease of implementation within the existing rules structure, an active judge solution in this
form suffers from one glaring problem: there is no uniform standard for
its application.271 While some judges may allow the discovery to proceed,

266

See supra Part IV.A.1.
FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (outlining the district court’s role in scheduling, pre-trial conferences,
and case management). In his Twombly dissent, Justice Stevens put forth several examples
of Rule 16’s potential uses:
Rule 16 invests a trial judge with the power, backed by sanctions, to
regulate pretrial proceedings via conferences and scheduling orders, at
which the parties may discuss, inter alia, “the elimination of frivolous
claims or defenses,” Rule 16(c)(1); “the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings,” Rule 16(c)(2); “the control and scheduling of
discovery,” Rule 16(c)(6); and “the need for adopting special procedures
for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve
complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual
proof problems,” Rule 16(c)(12).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593–94 n.13 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move
for a protective order in the court where the action is pending [e.g. a motion for summary
judgment] . . . . The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party . . . forbidding the disclosure or discovery.”). The court may, but is not required to, stay discovery
requests when a motion to dismiss is pending. Id.
269
See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473,
503–15 (2010).
270
Id. at 515.
271
See Bone, supra note 214, at 930–35.
267
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others may stay discovery until the motion to dismiss is adjudicated. Because there is no requirement to allow this discovery,272 judges could rely
upon any basis for denying its application. Plaintiffs lacking a minimal
guarantee of this form of limited discovery find themselves back at the
starting gate—hoping to outrun the danger of meritorious claim dismissal
under plausibility pleading. For environmental public interest litigants,
an active judge solution retains the same uncertainty of Iqbal with little
assurance of change.
To account for the inherent flaws in relying on judicial discretion,
another solution shifts the emphasis of reform to adjusting the structure
and timing of discovery. Following the path of pre-action discovery,273 some
scholars have advocated for procedural rules to implement discovery before commencing suit or before a motion to dismiss is determined.274 Currently, a small collection of state procedural systems implement versions
of this pre-action discovery and consequently provide examples (and data)
to evaluate the potential impact of a discovery rule change.275 In scrutinizing these systems, there is some evidence to suggest that plaintiffs may
rely upon pre-action discovery to gather sufficient information to meet
their pleading burden.276
The difficulty for federal rule sanctioned pre-action discovery is
not the lack of clear guidelines that plagues reliance on an active judge
solution. The deficiency lies in the scope of the solution. Greater discovery
rights only treat one symptom, information asymmetry.277 The additional

272

In contrast, the German judges have a mandatory duty to clarify the issues, even at
their own instigation. See supra Part IV.A.1.
273
See supra Part IV.A.2.
274
See generally Dodson, Comparative Convergences, supra note 73.
275
See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of
Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 236–46 (2007) (discussing
states with pre-action discovery provisions, which include New York, Florida, Alabama,
and Texas).
276
Id. at 278–79. Professor Hoffman concludes:
Examining the data from Texas demonstrates that there are plausible
reasons to believe that lawyers and prospective claimants in Texas, as
in most jurisdictions, may frequently be motivated to gather factual
information before suit to evaluate the viability of filing and pursuing
a case to settlement or judgment. The perceived need to satisfy formal
legal requirements for bringing suit, as well as the pull of practical considerations, thus may plausibly explain the incidence of use of the state’s
presuit discovery rule for investigatory purposes.
Id.
277
See generally Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, supra note 196.
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hardships environmental plaintiffs bear under Iqbal pleading remain
untreated. To understand what these hardships are, one must revisit the
Supreme Court’s shift in emphasis from notice pleading to fact pleading.278
Raising the specter of code pleading, Iqbal leads courts back to parsing
the difficult (and potentially harmful) distinctions made between factual
and legal conclusions.279
The challenge of discerning conclusory and non-conclusory allegations is heightened by Iqbal’s formulation of pleading: plausibility. Judges
are left to weigh their “judicial experience and common sense” to determine
whether plausibility exists in light of the non-conclusory factual allegations.280 Notwithstanding the Court’s disavowal,281 this test wades into the
realm of probability analysis.282 By contrast, notice pleading, although still
called upon to extract legal conclusions from entering the judicial calculus,
avoids this fate by examining pleadings for any legal theory or set of facts
under which a plaintiff could prevail.283
Defenders of plausibility pleading contend Iqbal requires no greater
analytical burden to sort allegations than courts operating under Conley
bore.284 Plausibility, in their view, is equivalent to the traditional requirement that factual inferences be “reasonable.”285 Moreover, they insist that
any argument against the ability of judges to perform this task is incongruous to judicial reality, especially when one considers that judges constantly

278

Dodson, Comparative Convergences, supra note 73, at 460.
See Marcus, The Revival, supra note 235, at 438 (“[T]he codifier’s reformulation of pleading rules . . . invited unresolvable disputes about whether certain assertions were allegations of ultimate fact (proper), mere evidence (improper), or conclusions (improper).”).
280
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
281
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (“Asking for plausible grounds
to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage . . . .”).
282
Bone, supra note 214, at 878 (“Properly interpreted, it requires no more than that the
allegations describe a state of affairs that differs significantly from a baseline of normality
and supports a probability of wrongdoing greater than the background probability for
situations of the same general type.”). See also Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note
71, at 444 (“Such a system of plausibility pleading requires that the complaint set forth
facts that are not merely consistent with liability; rather, the facts must demonstrate
‘plausible entitlement to relief.’ ”).
283
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim.”).
284
See Hartnett, supra note 269, at 484 (“Courts have long held that legal conclusions need
not be accepted as true on 12(b)(6) motions, [and they] have long insisted that pleaders are
not entitled to unreasonable factual inferences . . . .”).
285
Id. at 484–85.
279
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face difficult questions of differentiation between the boundaries of law
and fact.286
This argument does not account for other language in Iqbal that
appears to contradict the conclusion that a “reasonable inference is equivalent to a “plausible” one. Justice Kennedy states that factual allegations
in a plausible claim must “permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct” by “judicial experience and common sense.”287
Somewhat explicitly, this statement from the majority requires an undefined higher likelihood (or probability) that the facts plausibly establish
the claim.288
If one accepts the argument that greater probability is required
under Iqbal, then one thing is different between the proffered “difficult
choices” and pleading analysis—timing. Up until Iqbal, probability determinations of factual sufficiency were found in consideration upon motions
for summary judgment.289 Now that courts undertake these probability
determinations at the pleading stage, motions to dismiss are effectively replaced with summary judgment determinations.290 The timing differential
between the two motions impacts the procedural footing of the parties.
Motions to dismiss may be decided upon the basis of little evidence or
286

Id. at 488–89 (“Mixed questions of law and fact . . . have long presented the greatest
challenge. However they are properly handled for other purposes (such as allocating power
between state court and federal habeas court, between judge and jury, or between trial
court and appellate court) . . . .”).
287
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (emphasis added).
288
In the analysis of the facts in both cases, the Court uses language that indicates they
found a probability that the alleged wrongful conduct occurred. In Iqbal, the Court finds
that “[t]aken as true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin. But
given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.” Id. at 1951
(emphasis added). See also Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 565 (2007) (“The
nub of the complaint, then, is the ILECs’ parallel behavior, consisting of steps to keep the
CLECs out and manifest disinterest in becoming CLECs themselves, and its sufficiency
turns on the suggestions raised by this conduct when viewed in light of common
economic experience.”).
289
Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 833–34. See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS.
L. REV. 507, 534 (2009). Miller argues that while PSLRA’s heightened pleading rules may
not “ ‘convert[ ] the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment,’ as a practical
matter they come awfully close.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
290
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 71, at 486. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The
Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment
Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15
(2010).
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procedural safeguards,291 and, unlike motions for summary judgment,292
the plaintiff’s complaint bears the burden of sufficiency.
The detrimental impact of the probability requirement of Iqbal falls
disproportionately upon the future of environmental litigation. Evolving
claims are more susceptible to fail in their burden to plead facts that are
“likely” or “plausibly” explained by the alleged wrongful conduct. Therefore, even systemic procedural adjustments to counter information asymmetry do not protect plaintiffs from all the harmful effects of plausibility
pleading. For these reasons, this note puts forward a different solution to
alleviating the impact of Iqbal on environmental plaintiffs.
2.

Substantive Pleading

After evaluating the normative arguments for breaking up transsubstantive pleading and considering solutions that maintain uniformity,
one is left with the decision to construct a substantive pleading standard
linked to public interest litigation. To accomplish this, two paths of enactment are possible, proposal by the Rules Advisory Committee to the
Supreme Court293 or congressional statute;294 it would not be the first time
either body has carved out a pleading standard for a substantive area of
the law.295
The first potential approach envisions a change in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule (one might call it 9(i)) would state:
(i) Environmental Citizen Suits. In alleging a violation of
law under an environmental citizen suit provision, the
plaintiff may plead any set of facts consistent with providing notice to the defendant of the grounds for the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief.
291

See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 289, at 834.
The movant for summary judgment bears the initial burden. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
293
See FEDERAL RULEMAKING, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesandPolicies/
FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (describing the
specific steps in the rulemaking process).
294
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (authorizing Congress to “ordain and establish” the lower
federal courts).
295
The Advisory Committee’s Rule 9(b) currently requires the party to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” FED R. CIV. P. 9(b). For private
security actions, the congressionally enacted PSLRA requires that “the complaint shall . . .
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
292
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By emphasizing notice rather than plausibility, this rule provides plaintiffs opportunities to pass through the pleading gateway and into the
federal courthouse.
The difficulties of this reform lie in the approval process. Even if
the Rules Advisory Committee recognizes the need for a substance- specific
pleading standard, the Supreme Court itself must approve the proposed
rule.296 The Court’s opinion in Iqbal suggests that the Court still believes
plausibility is subsumed within notice.297 Therefore, routing environmental substantive pleading through the Federal Rules process is less likely
to succeed.
Alternatively, Congress may wade into the debate and secure a
return to notice pleading for environmental plaintiffs. Similar to a rule
change, Congress could enact an amendment to environmental statutes
that provide environmental citizen suit provisions. The language would
be similar to the proposed rule, emphasizing that a “plaintiff may plead any
set of facts consistent with providing notice to the defendant.” Congress
would be able to target specific areas where public interest litigation plays
a vital role in effecting the regulation of environmental norms.
Current citizen suit statutes will provide easily identifiable causes
of action to be amended by the new pleading provision. As new environmental regulations and statutes are developed, Congress may safeguard
the role of public interest litigation against federal judges struggling to
apply the currently challenging and unclear pleading standard. Moreover,
the very nature of the congressional approach, applying pleading standards
to specific actions, allows for more rigorous scrutiny of the unintended
effects such a change might entail.
In advancing these solutions, this note does not undertake a full
normative account of the value of substantive procedural rules.298 However,
improving the pleading fortunes of environmental plaintiffs by anchoring
the bar to notice suggests some beneficial results. The first area of improvement might be clarity. Because the probability requirement of plausibility
pleading is ambiguous, judges face a difficult challenge in weighing their
“judicial experience” to land on the appropriate level of factual allegations
required by the standard.299 Some scholars argue that Iqbal is an attempt
to provide a method to ascertain each pleading based on a different
296

See FEDERAL RULEMAKING, supra note 293.
See Hartnett, supra note 269, at 483–86.
298
This will be the task for another article, where it might be shown that this note’s frame
of argument might justify substantive pleading in other areas of the law.
299
See supra Part III.A.
297
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substantive area of the law through a contextual framework.300 Unfortunately, this judicial experience basis is not very transparent, to either
judges or plaintiffs. Instead, the clear emphasis on notice will enable courts
to ascertain the alleged violations as a function of the notice they provide
defendants, removing probability (as far as possible) from the equation.
A derivative implication of clarity is the notice provision’s opportunity to provide consistency. The clear emphasis on notice will enable
courts to ascertain the alleged violations and provide plaintiffs a much
smaller window of uncertainty in successful pleading. For public interest
plaintiffs to function as private attorneys general properly, they must be
able to rely upon a consistent application of pleading standards within the
environmental context.301
Another benefit of the pleading provisions will be the potential for
a substance specific body of case law to develop. Because the United States
shows no inclination to move environmental public interest litigation
claims into specialized courts, judges will continually face the challenge
of understanding some potentially complex and scientific environmental
disputes. By deciding environmental pleading cases on specific statutory
grounds, the courts will develop, over time, a body of case law that can
further instruct generalist judges.
Whatever the normative justifications, the legal net cast by this
new targeted pleading standard better empowers the full spectrum of environmental public interest actions. In this way, the purpose and function
of public interest environmental litigation may be secure.
CONCLUSION
The implications of Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility pleading
standard are far reaching. Currently, all plaintiffs are subject to the same
pleading rules, yet, not all plaintiffs’ litigation serves the same function.
For litigants who seek to vindicate the public’s environmental interest
300

See Hartnett, supra note 269, at 498–503. “Notice that in Twombly itself, the Court did
not rest its evaluation of plausibility solely on its own intuitive sense of the way the world
naturally works, or its sense of ‘common economic experience.’ It also relied on the particular
history of the telecommunications industry . . . .” Id. at 501 (internal citations omitted).
301
Professor Burbank makes a similar argument. See Burbank, supra note 87. “Federal
Rules that avoid policy choices and that in essence chart ad hoc decision-making by trial
judges are uniform and hence trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense. More important, the banner of simplicity and predictability under which they fly is by now false
advertising.” Id. at 715 (internal citations omitted).
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through litigation, Twombly and Iqbal stand as a potential hazard that
may inadvertently thwart meritorious environmental claims.
Because public interest environmental litigation continues to play
a crucial role in the regulatory structure of the United States, the consequences of this procedure and substance collision loom ever larger. With
global trends showing increased awareness of the important function such
litigation performs, the United States would be ill-advised to step back from
a leadership role in maintaining the mechanisms necessary for its citizens
to continue to enforce environmental policies. By breaking down the transsubstantive pleading barriers that hold meritorious plaintiffs hostage,
the United States may still “protect human health and . . . safeguard the
natural environment—air, water and land—upon which life depends.”302

302

History: Timeline, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/history/timeline/
index.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).

